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Abstract
We emphasize the dominance in the Monty Hall problem, both in the
classical scenario and its multi-door generalization. This is used to
show optimality of the class of always-switching strategies for nonuni-
form allocation of the prize and arbitrary door-revealing mechanism
in the event of match.
To switch or not to switch. . . You have two tries to find a prize
hidden behind one of three doors. You are first asked to choose a door but
not open it yet. Then one of the unchosen doors with no prize behind it will
be revealed, and you will be offered a second try. You win if the final choice
falls on the door concealing the prize. Does it matter if you switch?
This is the famous Monty Hall problem. It is commonly assumed, often
implicitly, that the prize is hidden “uniformly at random”, meaning that it is
equally likely to be behind each of the doors. There are two basic arguments
showing that switching is better. The arguments are among the best known
pieces of elementary probability theory (see e.g. the article [5] ), but we need
to sketch them here to show our point.
The cases argument goes as follows. Suppose the prize is behind door θ.
If you choose door 1 and then never switch, you win if θ = 1. If you choose
door 1 and always switch, you win when θ ∈ {2, 3}. The cases are mutually
exclusive, therefore the probability to win with switching is 2/3.
A major interest to the problem stems from the observation that many
people find this solution counter-intuitive, as they feel that the odds in fa-
vor of switching are 1:1 when one of the doors is revealed. Defining these
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conditional odds rigorously requires a further assumption on the random
mechanism selecting a door to reveal in the event of a match, when the initial
choice falls on the door hiding the prize. If the randomization is performed
by tossing the same fair coin, the conditional odds in favor of switching are
2:1 with certainty. This is the second, odds argument.
If the randomization is done by tossing a biased coin, with bias allowed
to depend on door θ ∈ {1, 2, 3} at which a match has occured, the odds are
still never unfavorable for switching. See Wikipedia pages on the Monty Hall
problem as a general source of references, [3] for discussion of assumptions,
[4] for a summary of other arguments and their interconnections and [10] for
many variations of the problem.
In the nonuniform case, denoting pθ the probability to find the prize
behind door θ (θ = 1, 2, 3), and q the conditional probability to leave door
2 unrevealed in the event of match at door 1, the odds in favor of switching
from door 1 to 2 are p2 : p1q, hence switching is advantageous when p1q < p2.
The inequality holds always for p1 < p2 but depends on q if p1 ≥ p2. For
instance, if p1 = 4/9, p2 = 3/9, p3 = 2/9 switching from door 1 to 2 is better
exactly when q < 3/4. Despite disadvantage in some situations, switching
cannot be devaluated: in the example the initial choice of door 1 was not
optimal, and you would get a higher chance to win the prize by first choosing
door 3 then switching all the time as the second try is offered. When the
probabilities pθ are not equal it is useful to evaluate the switching action in
combination with the initial choice.
. . . how can you know to which? Without assigning probabilities
to the doors the question Does it matter if you switch? is sometimes regarded
as not well-posed mathematically (e.g. [2], p. 56). Nevertheless, the question
makes sense if we consider the decision-making as a two-step process and
compare the class of strategies that always switch with all other strategies.
It turns that the problem has dominance that speaks in favor of always-
switching strategies.
To see the dominance we need to “switch the door” in the two basic
arguments. Let us start with the cases argument, and compare two constant-
action strategies A =“choose door 1, never switch” with B =“choose door 2,
always switch”. They might seem incomparable, because when A is played
door 1 cannot be revealed, and when B is played door 2 cannot be revealed.
However, this is irrelevant and, obviously enough, A wins for θ = 1 while
2
B wins for θ ∈ {1, 3}. Thus B is never worse than A and if door θ = 3 is
possible (in some sense), then B is even better (in this very sense).
The dominance reasoning parallel to the odds argument is slighly more
complicated. To increase generality suppose D is a finite set of doors with
at least three elements. You wish to guess door θ hiding the prize. You
first choose door x and then you are offered a switch to door y ∈ D \ {x}.
Both x and y can be θ, all other doors have been revealed as useless. Now
you need to decide whether θ and x match or mismatch, that is whether
x = θ or x 6= θ. A strategy is therefore a combination of x and a decision
function a(x, y) with values in the two-point set of actions {match, switch},
with match meaning staying with x and switch meaning switching from x.
We denote a∗ the always-switch decision function, with the only action
a∗(x, y) = switch for all y 6= x.
Your strategy is rewarded by means of the win-or-nothing payoff function
W defined as
W (θ, x, match) = 1(x = θ), W (θ, x, switch) = 1(x 6= θ),
where 1(· · · ) equals 1 if · · · is true, and equals 0 otherwise. Two actions
might seem permutable, but the symmetry is fallacious, because for every θ
there is only one x = θ and at least two x 6= θ.
The way we write the payoff function does not involve explicitly the de-
pendence on the door to which the switch is offered. It is this feature which
will enable us to compare the always-switching strategies with others. When
switching is offered to some door y 6= x, the inequality x 6= θ means, of
course, θ = y as we know that other doors have no prize. Nevertheless, the
intepretation of the win with switch as a mismatch of the prize door with
your initial choice is more insightful and general. We may think, for example,
of the game in which less doors are revealed as empty and switching is offered
to a subset of D \ {x}, with the convention that the action is successful if θ
is there.
The following key lemma is obvious from the definitions, and the domi-
nance is a consequence.
Lemma For all θ and distinct x, x′ ∈ D
W (θ, x, match) = 1 ⇒ W (θ, x′, switch) = 1.
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Dominance Theorem Suppose for some fixed x 6= y′ a decision function
a(x, ·) satisfies a(x, y′) = match. Then
W (θ, x, a(x, y)) ≤ W (θ, y′, switch)
for all θ and y 6= x, meaning that the strategy (x, a(x, ·)) is weakly dominated
by (y′, a∗).
Proof Strategy (y′, a∗) always wins unless θ = y′, whenW (y′, y′, switch) = 0,
but then W (y′, x, a(x, y′)) =W (y′, x, match) = 0 as well. 
One insightful way to explain the phenomenon of dominance is to observe
that for every strategy (x, ax(·)) there exists a ‘unlucky door’ u such that the
strategy misses the prize when it is behind u, no matter in which admissible
way the switching option is offered. Then the strategy (u, a∗) is weakly
dominating (x, a(x, ·)).
We display next the payoff structure for all strategies in the 3-door case,
D = {1, 2, 3}. The notation must be self-explaining, but keep in mind that
the value of variable y in the upper row is given in the case of match x = θ
(otherwise y = θ). For instance, let us check the entry 2ms/2,1: the notation
2ms encodes the strategy x = 2, a(2, 3) = switch, a(2, 1) = match, so if
θ = 2, y = 1 this is a win, W (2, 2, match) = 1. For entry 2ms/1,3 we have
the same decision function, θ = 1, in the notation of column 1,3 digit ‘3’ is
irrelevant since we have a mismatch, so y = θ = 1 and W (1, 2, a(2, 1)) =
W (1, 2, match) = 0.
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θ, y = 1,2 1,3 2,1 2,2 3,1 3,2
1ss 0 0 1 1 1 1
1ms 1 0 0 0 1 1
1sm 0 1 1 1 0 0
1mm 1 1 0 0 0 0
2ss 1 1 0 0 1 1
2ms 0 0 1 0 1 1
2sm 1 1 0 1 0 0
2mm 0 0 1 1 0 0
3ss 1 1 1 1 0 0
3ms 0 0 1 1 1 0
3sm 1 1 0 0 0 1
3mm 0 0 0 0 1 1
The dominance of always-switching strategies is seen by comparing the rows.
The payoff matrix appears in [9]. In [8] reduction by dominance was used
to arrive at the minimax winning probability 2/3 (see e.g. [9],[3]).
Although the domination is weak, in the sense that dominated strategy
cannot be strictly improved for all θ, it is a serious ground to discard domi-
nated strategies in many settings of decision making. Think for example of
guessing the right door when the prize is hidden by some algorithm. You
would not use a strategy if there is another one performing at least as good
and in some situations even better.
To maximize your score . . . In the Bayesian setting of the guess-
ing problem probabilities are assigned to all values of the variables out of
your control. One random variable is the door with the prize Θ, with some
specified probabilities pθ for each value θ ∈ D. Another random variable,
the door offered for switching Y is defined conditionally on the value Θ = θ
and your choice x. In the event of mismatch Θ 6= x we have Y = Θ, and
given Θ = x the variable Y assumes each admissible value y ∈ D \ {x} with
some probability qx,y. Think of biased roulette wheels, distinct for each door
x and each having #D − 1 positions to generate Y .
5
The probability to win with strategy a(x, ·) is equal to the expected payoff
EW (Θ, x, a(x, Y )) =∑
θ∈D\{x}
pθW (θ, x, a(x, θ)) +
∑
y∈D\{x}
pxqx,yW (x, x, a(x, y)) =
∑
θ∈D\{x}
pθ1(a(x, θ) = switch) +
∑
y∈D\{x}
pxqx,y1(a(x, y) = match) =
∑
y∈D\{x}
{
py1(a(x, y) = switch) + pxqx,y1(a(x, y) = match)
}
=
∑
y∈D\{x}
{
py1(a(x, y) = switch) + pxqx,y(1− 1(a(x, y) = switch)
}
=
px +
∑
y∈D\{x}
{
(py − pxqx,y)1(a(x, y) = switch)
}
.
In particular, the winning probability is equal to 1 − px for the always-
switching a∗, and is equal to px for always-matching a(x, ·) ≡ match, as it
was clear without computation.
. . . try first to miss the door! Finding the strategy with the
highest winning chance (aka Bayesian strategy) seems cumbersome from the
above explicit formula for EW (Θ, x, a(x, Y )). The odds in favor of switching
from x to y are py : pxqx,y, and these could be arbitrary, so the sign of
py − pxqx,y depends on qx,y if px > py.
The dominance helps. Discarding by dominance all strategies except
(x, a∗) we are left with maximizing 1−px over x ∈ D. Let θ
∗ be the least likely
door to conceal the prize (such door need not be unique), pθ∗ = minθ∈D pθ.
The always-switching policy (θ∗, a∗) yields the highest winning probability
1− pθ∗ , that is
max
x∈D, a(x,·)
EW (Θ, x, a(x, Y )) = P(Θ 6= θ∗) = 1− pθ∗ ,
whichever the random rule to reveal the doors in the event of match.
Switching from the least likely door is always beneficial since
py ≥ pθ∗ ≥ pθ∗qθ∗,y.
This could be concluded without evaluation of odds, directly from the op-
timality of the strategy (θ∗, a∗), which instructs that to get the prize it is
optimal to first miss it with the highest possible probability.
6
Instances of the problem with nonuniform distribution (3-door case) appear in
[10],[11], [7].
Dominance was used in some multi-door game variations of the problem [1].
Apparently, the dominance (in which sense?) in the standard MHP was conjec-
tured by columnist John Kay
If my conjecture has been right switching would be a (weakly) dominant
strategy, i.e. you can never lose by switching but you may gain (Financial
Times, 31 August 2005).
Acknowledgments The author is indebted to Richard Gill and Jim Pitman
whose polar views on the author’s engagement in the MHP generated this
note.
References
[1] Bailey, H. (2000) Monty Hall uses a mixed strategy Mathematics Mag-
azine, Vol. 73, No. 2 (Apr., 2000), pp. 135-141.
[2] Ethier, S.N. The Doctrine of Chances: Probabilistic Aspects of Gam-
bling, Springer, 2010.
[3] Gill, R. (2011) The Monty Hall problem is not a probability puzzle (It’s
a challenge in mathematical modelling), Statistica Nederlandica, Vol. 65,
No. 1, pp. 58-71.
[4] Gill, R. (2011) The Monty Hall problem,
http://www.math.leidenuniv.nl/~gill
[5] Gillman, (1992) The car and the goats, American Mathematical
Monthly, Vol. 99, pp. 3-7.
[6] Granberg, D. (1999) A new version of the Monty Hall dilemma with
unequal probabilities, Behavioral Processes, Vol. 48, pp 25-34.
[7] Grinstead, C.M. and Snell, J. L. Grinstead and Snell’s introduction to
probability.
http://www.math.dartmouth.edu/∼prob/prob/prob.pdf 2006 (on-
line version of Introduction to Probability, 2nd edition, published by
the Amer. Math. Soc.).
7
[8] Gnedin, A. (2011) The Mondee Gills game, preprint.
[9] Ha¨ggstro¨m O. Streifzu¨ge durch die Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, Springer
2005.
[10] Rosenhouse, J. (2009) The Monty Hall Problem, Oxford University
Press, New York.
[11] Tijms, H. Understanding Probability, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
8
